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Aligning Climate Finance 
for an Equitable and 
Sustainable Net Zero Future 
Key messages
 • Sustainable, resilient and inclusive climate finance cannot be effectively achieved without clear and 
consistent policies and regulation. 
 • Both public and private climate finance must be accelerated to fill the gap between current 
investment and that required to achieve a swift transition to net zero in line with the Paris Agreement.
 • Realigning global capital through a mainstreaming of climate and sustainability into all financing 
operations is urgently needed. Private sector action, currently driven by transition risk, requires effective 
policy frameworks for pricing of externalities and reporting on performance. 
 • A global goal for adaptation is required to drive the mobilisation of greater amounts of capital. 
Tracking the impact of adaptation interventions and emphasising their multiple benefits are key to 
upscaling adaptation finance.
 • Addressing loss and damage plays a critical role in building trust between parties, but negotiators 
must better recognise the challenges associated with liability concerns.
 •  Increasing the effectiveness of, and access to, funding requires greater country and local ownership 
of climate and development finance.
 • The Green Climate Fund should be re-engineered to leverage more finance from contributor 
countries, encourage private sector engagement and provide better direct access to the most 
vulnerable countries. 
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context
Climate finance, broadly understood as the public, 
private and alternative sources of financing at the 
local, national or international level in support of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, currently 
falls short of the requirements of a swift global 
decarbonisation in line with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement on climate change. This is especially true 
in the developing countries of the Global South which 
are often unable to mobilise or access sufficient 
investment for a range of measures to address the 
climate emergency. 
The IPCC has estimated that limiting the rise in global 
average surface temperatures to 1.5°C would require 
between US$1.6 trillion to US$3.8 trillion of annual 
mitigation investment in supply-side energy systems 
alone until 2050.1 This amount grows further when 
investments in other sectors and adaptation are 
included. However, tracked global climate finance 
flows only reached US$632 billion on average over 
the 2019/20 period, the large majority of which 
was mobilised in support of mitigation actions.2 
More than three quarters of this finance, for example 
investments in solar PV and wind power, does not 
cross borders and remains concentrated in OECD 
countries and China.2
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The finance that does flow from developed to 
developing countries (a key goal of the climate 
negotiations) has been estimated at US$78.9 billion 
in 2018, with mitigation accounting for 70 percent 
(US$55 billion) of the total, and adaptation and 
cross-cutting finance making up the rest.3 But with 
adaptation costs in developing countries expected to 
reach up to US$300 billion annually by 2030 (UNEP, 
2021)4, both the overall amount and the focus of the 
climate finance currently provided present a challenge 
to vulnerable developing countries threatened by the 
more extreme impacts of a warming world.
To close gaps, strengthen country ownership 
and increase trust in the climate finance provided, 
a number of deficits in the quality and composition 
of finance flows need to be addressed. 
These include the under-funding of adaptation, 
the lack of finance specifically for least developed 
countries (LDCs) and small island developing states 
(SIDS), a declining share of grant finance, and barriers 
to developing countries accessing climate finance.5
This briefing note identifies challenges for climate 
finance in the convention process. It outlines some 
of the steps necessary for the private sector to 
realign capital flow and proposes key actions that 
governments, financial institutions and other 
stakeholders should pursue with a view to not 
only increase the amount of investment provided 
for mitigation, adaptation and resilience-building 
interventions, but to also ensure that such investment 
is deployed effectively and efficiently, addressing the 
needs of those making decisions on the ground. 
Challenges and needs for climate finance
Mobilise private capital
The commitment to meet the goals of the Paris 
Agreement and mobilise sustainable, resilient and 
inclusive climate finance cannot be effectively 
achieved without clear and consistent policies 
and regulation. Governments have an opportunity 
to build an enabling environment and leverage 
private capital, a so far largely untapped pool of 
investment, to a far greater extent than is currently 
the case. Given the scale of the climate challenge 
at a time of constrained public budgets, the private 
sector has a critical role to play in financing the low 
carbon transition. 
Realigning the global financial system with 
commitments to net zero and the Paris Agreement, 
and getting the necessary capital to flow to 
developing and emerging markets must therefore 
be the focus of climate finance within the context 
of the climate convention. Achieving such alignment 
goes well beyond the already delayed delivery of 
$100 billion in annual climate finance promised to 
developing countries and faces challenges arising 
from four main issues: first, a lack of clear definitions 
and boundaries; second, contrasting methodological 
approaches; third, a lack of robust, comparable data 
on climate investments and their impact on the 
ground; and, fourth, an underappreciation of climate 
risks by private financial market actors. 
First, the broad definition of climate finance needs 
to give way to a new functional and consistent 
definition that works for both the public and private 
sector and enables climate finance to take advantage 
of the existing work on climate and sustainability risk 
and reporting currently transforming the financial 
system. The lack of a clear definition has made it 
increasingly difficult to monitor, report and verify 
climate finance flows and ensure that interventions 
are effective and equitable.6 Doing this also requires 
a clear picture of the different ways in which private 
capital can be mobilised, be it direct mobilisation, 
intermediate mobilisation, incentivisation, indirect 
mobilisation or catalytic effect.7
Second, standardisation of climate finance 
accounting needs to be addressed in such a way as 
to enable tracking, comparability and accountability 
by governments, donors and private investors. 
By integrating climate accounting into private 
sector approaches (accounting and reporting 
standards, benchmarks, assessment protocols) 
it will be easier to work across silos, both in terms 
of financial mechanism and sector, to affect the 
realignment of trillions in private and public capital 
necessary to achieve a low-carbon and sustainable 
future. Clarity on risk and opportunities arising 
from a more integrated understanding of climate 
and nature will enable an economy-wide shift into 
climate compatible investments and support the 
development of more resilient economies, while also 
protecting private sector investors.
Institutional investors with long-horizon investments 
require recognition in this category for example. 
Around the world, pension funds have trillions 
of accumulated assets under management 
(AUM) and are ‘starved’ for appropriate returns. 
Large deficits of defined benefit schemes and poor 
financial performance of defined contribution 
schemes call for a significant improvement in 
investment strategies.8,9 Investing pension funds’ 
money in projects supporting a net zero transition 
can both help to finance the green transformation 
and  support the long-term stability of the 
pension industry.  
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Third, lack of robust and comparable impact data 
throughout the financial ecosystem is one of the 
major challenges facing climate finance. There are 
challenges in tracking climate finance, exacerbated 
by limited availability in project data, limited capacity 
and willingness to provide relevant data (especially 
important in the Global South), availability of 
robust data across periods of time as well as data 
duplication which can arise from double counting.10 
At the same time, further work needs to be done on 
climate modelling to understand spatial and temporal 
impacts of climate change, as well as standardisation 
of scenario data and use. 
The lack of integration of impact data into 
investment decisions over time makes it difficult to 
assess the effectiveness of climate interventions. 
There is a need to identify factors that facilitate 
investment and assess the use of and impact on the 
environment, natural capital and biodiversity, as well 
as financial return. This will require the introduction 
of co-benefits and externalities to overall economic 
discussions, which includes a range of interventions 
from the pricing of natural capital, insurance costs 
and central bank stress testing for the economic 
impacts of climate risks and loss of biodiversity. 
Recognising the number of ‘units of value’ these 
elements contribute within accounting can transform 
an understanding of economic operational cost 
and return. 
This leads to the fourth aspect, the need for private 
sector capital to be realigned in order to factor in 
climate risk and achieve net zero by 2050. Many 
current investments by the private sector are not 
climate compatible and continue to go towards 
investment areas that will be negatively affected by 
climate change. For example, more than 90% of a total 
US$2.7 billion in energy deals announced at the 2020 
UK-Africa Energy Summit went to fossil fuel contracts.11 
At COP26, more than 450 financial institutions 
from 45 countries announced the alignment of $130 
trillion of assets under management to net zero.12  
However, this positive signal has raised concerns over 
greenwashing as the group, formed in April 2021 as 
the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), 
counts among its signatories many of the world’s 
leading backers of fossil fuel projects.13
A credible realignment would have significant 
implications across the supply chain and impact not 
only multinational enterprises (MNEs) but also small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which account 
for the majority of business activity and employment 
around the world.14 SMEs already face greater 
difficulties in accessing finance than MNEs and with 
no current requirement to report on sustainability 
actions, could face further hurdles in accessing net 
zero capital flows.15,16 The financing of SMEs must 
therefore be a consideration in the collaborative 
redesign of financial and operational practices 
intended to address the climate emergency.17,18
Mobilisation  • Scale-up public sector investments (e.g., through concessional instruments such as low-
interest loans and long grace periods, equity investments and risk mitigators, such as 
guarantees, first-loss protection, or grants) to leverage the delivery of significantly 
increased private capital flows. Use blended finance to address size disparity 
(projects that are too small for private finance to invest in). 
 • Integrate co-benefits and externalities to overall economic discussions on net zero 
climate action, for example through the effective pricing of carbon, natural capital 
accounting or central bank stress testing. 
 • Enhance synergies between climate and environment funding and its alignment 
between different UN environmental conventions such as the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
 • Increase capacity building overall at a systemic level – education, expertise, knowledge 
sharing, standardisation of MRV and corporate impact reporting.
Transparency  • Develop a roadmap for aligning climate investment and reporting with private sector 
net-zero strategies and SDG-aligned approaches.
 • Develop frameworks for assessing co-benefits – natural capital, biodiversity, social – 
and good practice around impact assessments to integrate into reporting.
Access  • Generate more targeted engagement with domestic private sectors in both developed 
and developing countries to understand how they can contribute to countries’ 
mitigation and adaptation plans. This should be used to develop context-appropriate 
frameworks for how domestic institutions can be enhanced to incentivise investments 
into mitigation, adaptation and resilience.
Key actions
4Aligning Climate Finance for an Equitable and Sustainable Net Zero Future
Successfully realigning  the global financial system 
demands the integration of  both physical and 
transition risk into decision making. Similarly, the 
relationship between climate, nature and biodiversity 
is increasingly recognised  and must be addressed. 
Achieving such a shift in financial decision making 
will require cross-border agreements and standards 
to drive transparency, performance tracking 
and comparability.19 
These issues are exacerbated by existing challenges 
in investing in developing and emerging markets. 
These often include: macroeconomic instability; 
weak banking systems and shallow capital markets; 
a higher cost of capital, a problem that is worsened 
by climate vulnerability;20,21 problems with governance 
and transparency – over 41% of all climate-related 
official development assistance (ODA) goes 
to countries designated at the highest risk for 
corruption;22 a lack of capacities and technology for 
sector ‘leapfrogging’; as well as weak property rights 
and high political risk.
Shift to adaptation
More money has flowed to adaptation and resilience-
building interventions in recent years. For example, 
the World Bank committed itself to increase direct 
adaptation finance to US$50 billion over the 2020-
25 period, putting the Bank’s adaptation finance 
in developing countries on par with its mitigation 
investments.24 However, the adaptation gap is not 
closing fast enough. Both a significant further 
scaling up and a shift in focus to vulnerable 
countries are required. 
The devastating impacts of severe floods and 
prolonged wildfire seasons on some of the world’s 
largest economies have led to urgent calls for a 
dramatic increase in adaptation finance to build 
greater resilience and prepare communities for 
the consequences of a warming world. However, 
adaptation finance as understood in the context 
of the climate convention should primarily flow to 
the most climate-vulnerable developing countries 
of the Global South due to their lack of technical 
capacity and finance. The annual cost of adaptation 
in developing countries alone is currently estimated to 
stand at roughly US$70 billion, although this amount 
is expected to rise to US$140–300 billion in 2030 and 
up to US$500 billion by the middle of the century.4 
Mobilisation  • Agree a specific global goal for adaptation, to drive adaptation finance and focus. 
Countries need to accelerate their progress towards developing national adaptation 
plans and to scale down these plans to local levels. 
 • Address vulnerable developing countries’ unsustainable debt burdens by pushing for 
comprehensive debt relief by public and private creditors and linking this to policies 
that support a green and inclusive recovery. This will free up investment for climate 
adaptation and resilience-building interventions.21,29
 • Advocate for a deeper and more complete understanding of the benefits and costs 
of adaptation and resilience-building interventions to unlock greater funding flows, 
especially from the private sector. The triple dividend of adaptation and resilience 
building captures not just avoided economic losses but also economic development 
gains, and additional social and environmental benefits.31,32 
Transparency  • Push for greater transparency and accountability as essential for both short-term 
adaptation projects and long-term climate-resilient development. Granularity in 
reporting of climate investment and impact will help to track investment and improve 
understanding of adaptation success.
Access  • Address the growing need for direct access to climate finance for developing 
and emerging markets. This will require capacity building and knowledge sharing, 
building an enabling framework for robust data built on local access, knowledge 
and implementation.
 • Involve local communities in decisions in adaptation decision making to improve the 
effectiveness of climate finance. Doing so needs to include an acknowledgement 
of local beliefs and customs; the recognition of elders and local champions; the 
identification and prioritisation of vulnerable stakeholders; and linking local knowledge 
to climate change science in a two-way dialogue that resonates with local experience 
and motivates rather than discourages adaptation actions.33
Key actions
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The relative investment need is greatest in vulnerable 
developing countries, but evidence shows that 
multilateral donors do not prioritise them at 
the project selection stage and the amount of 
adaptation finance they have received from bilateral 
donors has been smaller than that flowing to less 
vulnerable countries.25 The lack of finance is further 
compounded by the inability of recipient countries’ 
domestic institutions to meet specific fiduciary 
standards and other access requirements, insufficient 
human resource support and the inflexibility of 
current approaches which are biased in favour of 
governments and against non-traditional actors such 
as local enterprise and grassroots organisations.26
Adaptation finance poses particular challenges for 
private capital. Of the global total adaption finance 
mobilised in 2019/20, only two percent came from 
the private sector.27 Barriers to greater private 
investment in vulnerable developing countries 
include: a lack of decision-useful risk and vulnerability 
data to guide investment, limited information on 
capital investment gaps, and actual or perceived 
low returns on investment.28 In addition, due to their 
greater exposure to climate risks and the resultant 
increased cost of capital, vulnerable developing 
countries are burdened with higher interest payments 
to service public and private debt.29 The recession and 
debt distress resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic 
has further exacerbated this situation.28,21,29
Adaptation, resilience-building and sustainable 
development measures often overlap. A false 
dichotomy between adaptation and more traditional 
development finance to ensure one is not simply 
repackaged as the other, may hinder funding flows, 
especially to vulnerable developing countries where 
climate change threatens all development objectives.30
Address loss and damage
The issue of compensating for loss and damage 
from unavoidable impacts of climate change is 
intertwined with questions over the future direction 
of investment in adaptation and resilience-building. 
Developing countries have called for compensation 
from developed countries, while developed countries 
have sought instead to treat losses and damages 
as a sub-component of adaptation within the 
UNFCCC negotiations. The disconnect between the 
two positions has significantly eroded trust within 
the negotiations.
At a basic level, a sense of greater justice in climate 
finance involves an acknowledgment of losses and 
damages already incurred by LDCs and SIDS and 
a firm commitment to reducing them through 
both financial and non-financial means. At a 
more complex level, justice requires consideration of 
long-term challenges not currently addressed by the 
modalities of financial operation such as slow-onset 
events, non-economic losses, or displacement related 
to the adverse impacts of climate change.34 
Negotiations on loss and damage can only be 
accelerated once LDCs and SIDS can effectively take 
stock of and quantify impacts incurred within their 
respective jurisdictions. The following discussions 
can then focus on whether and how current flows 
of finance can be used to address these losses and 
damages or whether new sources and flows of 
climate finance are needed.
LDCs and SIDS emphasise the need for financing for 
loss and damage that is additional to existing flows of 
climate finance for adaptation. These countries also 
emphasise the need for technical assistance towards 
LDCs and SIDS to identify and address climate 
change related loss and damage.35,36,37 
Mobilisation  • Operationalise the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage. Achieving its intended 
purpose of providing technical assistance to LDCs and SIDS is critical to ensure that 
these countries can systematically map losses and damages related to climate change 
impacts and quantify them.
 • Design effective and robust methods for integrating loss and damage issues into public 
investment planning at national and international levels.
 • Redesign existing climate finance institutions such as the GCF to integrate loss and 
damage into funding approaches and structures.
Transparency  • Ensure LDCs and SIDs are meaningfully included in the operationalisation of the 
Santiago Network.
 • Assess the extent to which existing mechanisms such as the CTCN can be used to 
further support SIDs and LDCs in addressing loss and damage.
Access  •  Explore ways to make existing funding more accessible for local groups in developing 
countries.39 Loss and damage mechanisms will only be successful if they can reach the 
most vulnerable communities.
Key actions
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The establishment of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage began to address 
a number of concerns, but concrete actions are 
desired. Rather than further dividing negotiation 
parties over issues of accountability and liability, it 
may be more politically prescient to advance the 
idea of initially voluntary grant-based funding paid in 
solidarity rather than as compensation. Establishing 
the issue of loss and damage as a permanent high 
level agenda item in the COP process is an important 
step in anchoring this debate.38
Funding effectiveness and access
While there is more climate funding available today 
than ever before, its effectiveness remains low 
and access to it continues to be difficult. Climate-
impacted groups are not always reached and 
intended adaptation and mitigation outcomes are 
often not met. Between 2003 and 2016, less than 10 
percent of climate finance committed to developing 
countries by international, regional and national 
funds went to locally focused projects, resulting in a 
lack of resilience to the impacts of climate change.40 
Climate finance makes up around one quarter 
of all global financial aid to developing countries 
today. However, disbursement focused on climate 
adaptation is low compared to other development 
finance. For example, the disbursement ratio for 
development finance targeting climate adaptation 
measures including agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
water supply and sanitation across East Africa – 
one of the most important regions for UK ODA 
– stood at only 52.7% for the 2009-2018 period, 
compared to 84.4% for development finance more 
generally. This may point to challenges around the 
effective implementation of projects on the ground 
and highlights the importance of a continued 
commitment to avoid redirection of funds after they 
have already been approved. 
Rather than increasing resilience and adaptive 
capacity, some projects may further create 
new or aggravate existing vulnerabilities. 
Such maladaptation can come as the result of an 
insufficient understanding of the specific contexts 
within which vulnerability exists (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity or class divides), ineffective attempts to 
simply tack adaptation on to existing development 
projects, a lack of involvement of local stakeholders 
in designing and implementing adaptation 
measures, and poor definitions of what constitutes 
adaptation ‘success’.41 Furnishing local actors with 
genuine agency, sufficient resources and capabilities 
can produce the kind of low-risk, equitable 
adaptation solutions that donors and international 
implementation entities would like to see but are 
unable to create themselves.42 
At the same time, there needs to be a consistency 
in approaches to such funding. The repurposing of 
ODA as climate finance, as well as the reduction in 
ODA which has been in response to strained public 
finances post-COVID, are raising concerns within 
the climate finance community that pledges are 
being made without concrete actions to ensure 
they are achieved.
Mobilisation  • Enable greater country ownership of development finance targeting climate 
adaptation. Domestic institutions at national, subnational and local levels are better 
able to understand how Paris-aligned measures can be made to be inclusive and 
empower a wide range of stakeholders. This includes central banks and supervisory 
authorities as critical players in supporting the scaling of sustainable finance.43
Transparency  • Equip developing country national budgeting systems to track and monitor how 
adaptation finance is spent at the local level. Involving local actors in funding decisions 
and making budget information publicly available builds better understanding and 
holds governments and other stakeholders involved in the disbursement of funds 
to account. 
Access  • Use climate finance instruments that recognise and address developing countries’ 
capacity gaps and adaptation priorities. This will require collaboration between donor 
countries and recipients.44 Granular, reliable, decision-useful data needs to be gathered 
and analysed to ensure climate adaptation and mitigation goals are met and scarce 
available funds are used to the greatest effect possible. 
 • Support locally-led adaptation by directing finance flows to local actors, enabling 
capacity development, adaptation planning and development of physical infrastructure 
for risk management.
 • Develop durable financing partnerships between international finance institutions and 
local institutions to source and fund bankable projects on the ground.
Key actions
7Aligning Climate Finance for an Equitable and Sustainable Net Zero Future
Re-engineer functioning institutions
The architecture of global climate finance does not 
suffer from a shortage of financial mechanisms and 
international accredited implementation entities. 
Although the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is only 
one amongst many climate finance institutions, 
its visibility in terms of deployment of the US$100 
billion promised to developing countries annually 
to help finance climate mitigation and adaptation 
interventions has made it a frequent target 
of discussion.
Despite noble intentions and a recent acceleration 
of funding approvals, the GCF is not working 
as intended and has fallen short of delivering 
outcomes required to achieve the transformational 
goals of the Paris Agreement. As of June 2021, the 
GCF had raised roughly US$17.8 billion in confirmed 
pledges45, and was supporting 177 projects with 
US$8.9 billion committed over a multi-year horizon. 
This is a very small amount of finance when 
compared to other international finance institutions 
such as the World Bank which delivered US$21 
billion in climate finance to low- and middle-income 
economies in 2020 alone. As of July 2021, the GCF was 
still unable to balance nominal allocations of finance 
between adaptation and mitigation, with mitigation 
finance being 32% higher than adaptation.46
Access to GCF finance by developing countries 
remains a key barrier.37,47 Developing country 
institutions are disproportionately disadvantaged 
when engaging with and attempting to access 
funding directly from the GCF. Accreditation 
processes are lengthy and particularly resource 
intensive for direct access entities, with most 
approved funding being allocated to international 
accredited entities.48,49 GCF support is also not 
directed to where it is most needed, with some of 
the most vulnerable countries not receiving any 
adaptation finance.50 The Fund requires sufficient 
transparency and accountability arrangements to 
generate information that can be used to determine 
whether financing for adaptation reaches the 
local level.51
Such problems are embedded within the structural 
design of the global climate finance landscape, 
built on historical institutional frameworks that 
are no longer fit for purpose. As the wider finance 
landscape is evolving to address externalities beyond 
GHGs, a more integrated approach is required. 
New mechanisms are not the answer, considering 
the rapid need for action, but existing arrangements 
need reform to be able to deliver on the goals of the 
Paris Agreement. 
Mobilisation  • Partner more closely with institutional donors and private sector actors to further 
explore innovative finance options that can be used to achieve the climate goals 
of recipients.
Transparency  • Strengthen transparency and accountability of the GCF to enable monitoring of their 
performance against developing country priorities and Paris Agreement goals. The GCF 
needs to work with its partners to generate consistent and granular information on 
allocation and spending of climate finance. This information will enable assessments 
on whether climate finance is achieving the intended outcomes.
 •  Improve Fund governance to resolve the mismatch between the vision of the GCF and 
its operationalisation if there is to be greater private sector participation. A starting 
point would be the recognition that vulnerable developing countries need genuine 
agency in determining how GCF finance is allocated and used to support adaptation 
and mitigation.
Access  • Enhance direct access to climate finance and increase commitments for locally-led 
action. This requires climate finance access modalities that are responsive to the 
capacity gaps experienced by these direct access entities.
Key actions
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